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Abstract: Contesting binaries that tend to underlie claims about automation, 
this article seeks to complicate arguments that are made about digital 
technology and the processes and practices of automation essential to it. In 
particular, it contests a well-entrenched distinction between infrastructures 
and culture, so as to consider more carefully the relationship between 
processes and practices of automation distributed throughout the increasingly 
planetary web of digital infrastructures, and subjectivity. Rather than viewing 
the logic of automation through the lens of value extraction, the paper links 
post-Foucauldian arguments about governmentality and the production of 
subjectivity to the strategic origins of computation in war, on the one hand, 
and processes and practices of infrastructure production on the other. This 
in turn facilitates a more nuanced, micropolitical, view of the grey area of 
human-machine relations worked on by automation. 
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INTRODUCTION
According to the pundits, business school apologists, management consultants 
and Silicon Valley boosters, people whose stock in trade is performative 
commenting on business trends, we are living in the era of the rise of the 
robots. Anyone with a memory might be forgiven for thinking that this is not 
news. The art of presenting history in terms of broad-brush abstractions – 
information, technology, artificial intelligence – and offering only the most 
cursory analysis (if at all) of the failings of previous grand predictions, whether 
the revolution promised is apocalyptic or utopian, has accompanied the 
development of the computer more or less since its inception. But this time, 
we are told, the automation in question is ‘different’. In curiously imperative 
language, we are also told, it is time to ‘be afraid’.1 Perhaps because this time 
it is a stratum of more professional white collar jobs (not lowly clerical work or 
blue collar manual labour) that are on the line, there is indeed a difference, 
but of tone perhaps, not dynamic. The highly selective correlations, between 
technology investment and productivity, remain largely the same and the 
analysis is no less beholden to the powerful modernising tropes of economistic 
progressivism, but the importuning is that bit more hysterical. Technology, 
1. Martin Ford, The 
Rise of the Robots, 
London, Oneworld, 
2015, is a good 
example of the 
genre.
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in the abstract, is still the driver and adaptation to it still the solution. 
 Claims that digital technology will ‘revolutionise’ the world have been a 
recurrent feature of the discourse around computers and computerisation 
since the Second World War. Sometimes such claims are framed precisely in 
terms of computers and computerisation, at others in much broader terms. 
The writings of John Diebold, author of a 1952 book on Automation: the 
Advent of the Automatic Factory and characterised in a New York Times obituary, 
in 2005 as a ‘visionary of the computer age’ might stand as a good example 
of the genre, framing information and communication as the ‘very core’ of 
human society and predicting great progress.2 But he’s not the only one, 
and the arguments cut both ways: Norbert Weiner, for example, was already 
predicting in 1949, the replacement of the mass worker by the ‘automatic 
assembly line’, not without justification.3 Claims for epochal transformation 
have spawned much futurological prognostication not just in managerial 
discourse, policy circles, and tech publications, but also in the social sciences, 
in political theory and philosophy, where Teilhard de Chardin-type cosmic 
evolutionism is palpable, in arguments for a ‘fourth’ revolution. History, it 
has been claimed, is ‘synonymous with the information age’.4
 Yet for every successfully functioning technoscientific apparatus, in every 
new ‘wave’ of automation, there are always others that fail. For every globally 
successful platform there are dozens – start-ups and projects alike – that fall 
by the wayside. IT project failure – some reports suggest, conservatively, 
an average 40 per cent failure rate per annum5 – itself is big business and 
‘crisis’ seems to be built into the history of the software industry.6 For every 
new, heavily promoted development in AI, there are the myriad false steps 
– technical and epistemic, theoretical and practical – of AI in the past, with 
nothing like a ‘normal science’ ever having been established, just a loose set of 
postulates about intelligence and an appeal to the Turing ‘test’. Theorists can 
and do claim paradigmatic status for technological or economic development, 
as well as for science, but usually on the basis of a rather selective reading of 
Kuhn’s work. The production of textbooks and consensus amongst computer 
scientists or AI practitioners isn’t really enough to turn something into a 
science. Indeed, as the historian of computer science Michael Mahoney 
has pointed out, discussing a ‘state of the field’ report from 1975 entitled 
‘What can be automated?’ the ‘fundamental mathematical questions’ that 
computer science asked ‘tended to follow developments in technology and 
its application’ and hence presuppose that technology’s existence.7 
 This is not to say that computer-based automation, of the AI-kind, doesn’t 
employ often very sophisticated forms of scientific knowledge. But it does 
mean that analysis has to be rather more circumspect about ‘fundamental’ 
claims and what they overlook than the recurrent appeal to the ‘paradigm’ 
suggests. Journalists and others can – and do – give contemporary technology 
the allure of fate by projecting ‘information’ back into the mists of time, but 
this doesn’t stop the appeal of their narratives (like those of other pop science 
2. Jennifer Bayot, 
‘John Diebold, 79, 
a Visionary of the 
Computer Age, 
Dies’ New York 
Times 27/12/2005 
online at: https://
www.nytimes.
com/2005/12/27/
nyregion/john-
diebold-79-a-
visionary-of-the-
computer-age-dies.
html.
3. David F. Noble, 
Forces of Production. 
A Social History 
of Automation, 
New Brunswick 
NJ, Transaction, 
2011; Nick Dyer-
Witherford Cyber-
Proletariat: Global 
Labour in the Digital 
Vortex, London, 
Pluto, 2015, chapter 
3.
4. Luciano 
Floridi, The Fourth 
Revolution, Oxford, 
Oxford University 
Press, 2014, p3.
5. See for example 
the reports 
produced by 
TechRepublic, https://
www.techrepublic.
com/article/
it-project-failures-
costly-techrepublic-
gartner-study-finds/ 
(accessed 1 October, 
2019).
6. Nathan 
Ensmenger, The 
Computer Boys Take 
Over, Cambridge 
MA, MIT Press, 
2010. 
7. Michael S. 
Mahoney, ‘Computer 
Science. The Search 
for a Mathematical 
Theory’ in J. 
Echeverria, A. Ibarra 
and T. Mormann 
(eds), The Space of 
Mathematics, Berlin, 
De Gruyter, 1992, 
p358.
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proselytising on behalf of neo-Darwinism) to the ‘hard truths’ of technoscience 
from being covertly first-world-centric teleology. In stories about the rise of the 
robots considerable attention is usually given to carefully selected, excessively 
decontextualised examples, a move symptomatic of the broader forgetting 
of what Gray and Suri refer to as the ‘ghost work’ that transforms artificial 
intelligence into artificial artificial intelligence, the smoke and mirrors of 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.8 In any case, much less attention is paid to the 
more mundane apparatuses of automation which facilitate the growing 
encroachment of large technology corporations on everyday life, on what’s 
left, in the global North, of the institutions of the welfare state, and on the 
privacy of the individual. Automation at an infrastructural level, sometimes 
euphemised as ‘unbundling’, an efficacious tactic in the strategic re-aligning 
of public and private interest, goes uncommented, at least until ‘lock-in’ makes 
reversing transformations impossible, as contemporary concerns about the 
‘automation of the welfare state’ suggest.  
 Undoubtedly the noisiest, and perhaps most seductive, elements of the 
post-war discourse on computers and automation through and of information 
technology have concerned the transformation of work. But it is also necessary 
to note the presence, alongside the media discourse amplifying the futurology 
that has persistently accompanied the growth of IT, of a voluble concern about 
other aspects of this development, specifically now ‘internet addiction’. Whilst 
still not in the prescribers’ bible, the DSM, and like its equally nebulous sibling 
‘technology addiction’, internet addiction raises the spectre of another kind 
of automation. Not automation of the ‘transformation of work by machines’ 
kind but automatism of the compulsive, binding of drive energy, psychic kind. 
Routinely glossed in terms of generic, quasi-scientific ‘dopamine hit’ based 
explanations, this other kind of automation, often linked to scare stories about 
the online gaming habits of young men, communicates also with a recent spate 
of stories about repentant West Coast technologists, now pleading in favour 
of humane technology. ‘Our’ addiction to technology, the stories run, is then 
transformed into a narrative of psychological balance versus corporate greed. 
Analysis of the broader assemblages of which ostensibly addictive technologies 
are a part, and of the ways in which humans are incorporated into such 
apparatuses more generally, then tends to disappear, effectuating a kind of 
amnesia about technological history. The transformation of the computer as 
element of managerial technocracy into instrument of personal liberation, 
explored by Fred Turner, extends finally into a symptom of individualised, 
neurochemical, failure.9
 Crude though it is, juxtaposing different kinds of scare stories about digital 
technology can highlight something of the complexities with which an analysis 
of contemporary automation anxiety, or anxieties, has to contend, and it raises 
questions about the manner in which discourses about specific technologies 
draw on broader features of thinking within modernity. The separation of 
compulsion/addiction concerns from rise of the robots futurology, as expressed 
8. Mary L. Gray and 
Siddharth Suri, Ghost 
Work. How to Stop 
Silicon Valley from 
Building a New Global 
Underclass, New 
York, Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 
2019.
9. Fred Turner, From 
Counterculture to 
Cyberculture, Chicago 
IL, University of 
Chicago Press, 2006.
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in Anglophone media, in particular, echoes the institutional entrenchment 
of dualistic thinking of the subject-object kind: objective transformation of 
the economic sphere of work, subjective transformation of the individual, 
particularly in the context of leisure activities. But that division leaves far too 
many questions about automation, what ‘it’ is, how it functions, unanswered. 
In this respect, and as a variant form of the moral panics that traditional 
media excel in generating, automation anxieties confirm, a bit too easily, 
a more general understanding of automation that continues to dissociate 
digital technological infrastructures and symbolic, subjective cultures. 
 It is the contention of this essay, by contrast, that analysing the 
transformations associated with digital technological automation must 
ultimately be undertaken in terms of a problematic of the production of 
subjectivity for which it (automation) has become one of the crucial vectors. 
A problematic that emerges out of the work of Félix Guattari in particular, 
addressing subjectivity as produced entails viewing it as immanent to socio-
economic configurations, it entails seeing drive energies, affective dispositions 
and configurations not as a sort of epiphenomenal add-on to broader processes 
but as an integral part of them in their complex, variegated materiality. Whilst 
it seems a bit glib now, Guattari’s claim that ‘desire is part of the infrastructure’ 
captures well a crucial characteristic of thinking in terms of the production 
of subjectivity: challenging the well-entrenched intellectual habit of thinking 
in terms of the subject-object division, even in the intimate recesses of the 
unconscious.10 Contemporary anxieties over automation, from this point 
of view, are to be understood not simply as individual responses to heavily 
saturated media representations of the rise of the robots, or as a medico-
mediatic concern with a vague neuropsychologically framed compulsion, 
but rather treated as indices of a determinate configuration of a social field 
that is increasingly planetary in scope, a social field that is less a global civil 
society, as new forms of liberalism might claim, and more the ongoing product 
of a form of governmentality that formats populations at a problematically 
planetary scale. This is not a conventional manner of exploring processes 
and practices of automation. For critical social, cultural and political thinking 
about automation, the allure of technoscientific eulogising tends for the 
most part to be replaced with analysis of the exploitative, political economic 
dynamic of the development of capitalism (debates over the labour theory 
of value figure strongly here). However, even in the most hard-headed of 
these accounts, some sort of variant form of the historical ruse of reason 
tends to inform the political consequences that are drawn from such analyses. 
Total automation – of intellectual and manual labour, can ultimately only 
be progressive. Of course, there is no mistaking the fact that automation 
in the contemporary era is very much a crucial economic phenomenon, 
that the transformation of work in recent decades, whether framed as 
part of a fourth revolution, a knowledge economy, the shift into cognitive 
capitalism, or something else, has a powerfully technological flavour. Nor is 
10. Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus, 
Minneapolis, 
University of 
Minnesota Press, 
1983, p104.
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there any mistaking the conjunctural nature of the resurgence of concerns 
about automation, specifically its coinciding with post-crash austerity-based 
restructuring. But what is far less clear is what conclusions can reasonably 
be drawn from such connections. The sheer extensiveness of processes and 
practices of automation across digital infrastructures – so-called ubiquitous 
computing – and the intensity of subjective investments in such infrastructures, 
raises questions about technology that are not easily addressed within existing 
theoretical frameworks. 
STRATEGIC EXPERTISE
The historical emergence of computing out of technological and scientific 
developments during and after the Second World is, of course, reasonably 
well known, its cultural complexities attested to indirectly in Donna Haraway’s 
early work, its embedding in the paranoid narrative of the Cold War 
explored in Edwards’ discussion The Closed World, and so on.11 Numerous 
historians have traced out the web of links drawing together the military, 
corporations and universities, the ‘Iron Triangle’ around which the post-war 
era of ‘big science’ inaugurating the kind of developments forming what 
Bell would later call ‘post-industrial society’. ‘Cyborg science’, ‘World War 
II regime’, ‘Manichean sciences’ are perhaps a bit less euphemistic about 
the simultaneously political, military and technological qualities of the 
nature of the technoscientific expertise that took shape in the middle of the 
last century in the West. And whilst it’s tempting to cherry-pick from such 
research to confirm broader macro-scale arguments (e.g. about domination 
and the instrumental rational nature of technoscience), it’s actually rather 
difficult to separate the early development of computing from the broader 
sets of institutional relations, scientific and technological practices and 
macro-political priorities (and paranoia) of the Cold War period. There’s 
not much that exemplifies the effects of the emergent military-industrial-
university complex better than computation. After all, one of the biggest 
winners of the big science practiced at Los Alamos was the computer, which 
in its use to simulate the numerically highly complex behaviour of sub-atomic 
particles, as Galison argues, generated a transformation of scientific practices, 
troubling conventional distinctions between theory and experiment through 
its production of artificial realities (the bomb as a simulated phenomenon, in 
the first instance). The computer, as he puts it ‘began as a “tool”, an object 
for the manipulation of machines, objects, and equations. But bit by bit (byte 
by byte), computer designers deconstructed the notion of a tool itself as the 
computer came to stand not for a tool, but for nature’.12 
 Oddly though, this development, which was not without a correlative 
transformation of the mathematicians, physicists, statisticians, engineers and 
others involved the mission-directed activity of the Second World War and 
thereafter, was also accompanied by a particular presentation of science that 
11. Donna Haraway, 
‘A Cyborg Manifesto: 
Science, Technology 
and Socialist-
Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth 
Century’ in 
Symians, Cyborgs, 
and Women. The 
Reinvention of 
Nature, New York, 
Routledge, 1991; 
Paul N. Edwards, 
The Closed World: 
Computers and the 
Politics of Discourse 
in Cold War 
America, Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1996. 
(Hereafter Closed 
World).
12. Peter Galison, 
Image and Logic: A 
Material Culture of 
Physics, Chicago, 
University of 
Chicago Press, 1997, 
p777.
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was, in some respects, at odds with the troubling position of the computer in 
the theory-experiment-instrument hierarchy of scientific understanding. The 
era of ‘big science’ from which the development of computing is inseparable, 
is an era of the general mobilisation of scientific and technological research, 
in which scientific practices are allied to a powerfully interventionary state – 
Balogh’s ‘proministrative state’ – in which fundamental, or ‘basic’ research, 
presented as autonomous, as Science, the ‘goose that lays the golden eggs’, is 
linked closely to the management of society.13 The emerging technologies of 
computation and the practices associated with them took their place within 
this inter- or trans- disciplinary research formation and to a considerable 
extent came to frame themselves in terms of a discourse of Science (the 
‘endless frontier’) distinguished by its capacity to address and to understand 
problems that the public at large could not but fail to understand. 
 When Allen Newell and Herb Simon, in their 1975 address to the 
Association of Computing Machinery, presented themselves as ‘basic scientists’ 
whose work might easily be misunderstood by the outside world – a society 
which ‘often becomes confused’ about why computers are built, which ‘needs 
to understand’ that basic research will ‘pay off ’ in terms of new techniques 
– they were doing nothing other than presenting their work and its yield in 
technological terms quite precisely in terms of this view of scientific practices 
as Science.14 And in many respects, when commentators such as Daniel Bell, 
writing about post-industrial society, thematised the ‘codification of theoretical 
knowledge’ in ‘intellectual technology’ as key to the changing morphology 
of Western societies, they were likewise pointing precisely to an apparatus 
of knowledge production in which a peculiarly abstracted understanding of 
scientific and technical practices was configured, in which theoretical claims 
developed in the former explained or were the directive force for the latter. 15 
Referring as he does to ‘new relations between theory and empiricism’, Bell was 
transcribing the image of scientific and technological practices as Science that 
had been assumed by well-known figures in the emerging military-industrial 
complex (p216). He was also – and not incidentally – ventriloquising a view of 
rationality that saw the rule-based formalism of the algorithm as substituting 
for intuitive judgement16 in decision-making, a process that had already shown 
itself, albeit in a problematic way, as being crucial to the development during 
Second World War of what Will Thomas calls the ‘policy sciences’.17 It’s a view 
of rationality that figured very heavily too in the emerging field of ‘cognitive 
science’, which in many respects transformed psychology and its view of the 
individual along recognisably normative lines, as a number of commentators 
have argued.18  Refigured, via systems analysis and management scientists 
in particular, as ‘information technology’ in the late 1950s, such thinking 
was already promising revolutionary transformations, specifically in terms of 
facilitating the emergence of top-down managerial control. Early theorists, for 
example, quite specifically drew an analogy between the manner in which IT 
would allow top layers of management to control middle management, ‘just 
13. Brian Balogh, 
‘Reorganizing the 
Organizational 
Synthesis: Federal-
Professional 
Relations in Modern 
America’, Studies 
in American Political 
Development 5, 1, 
1991.
14. Allen Newell 
and Herbert 
Simon,‘Computer 
Science as Empirical 
Inquiry: Symbols 
and Search, 
Communications of the 
ACM, 19, 3, 1976.
15. Daniel Bell, 
The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society 
quoted in Ronald R. 
Kline, The Cybernetics 
Moment: Or Why 
We Call Our Age the 
Information Age, 
Baltimore MA, Johns 
Hopkins University 
Press, 2015, p216.
16. See in particular 
Paul Erickson et 
al, How Reason 
Almost Lost its 
Mind. The Strange 
Career of Cold War 
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IL, University of 
Chicago Press, 
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Matthew Fuller and 
Andrew Goffey, Evil 
Media, Cambridge 
MA, MIT Press, 
2011, p18.
17. Will Thomas, 
Rational Action, 
Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 2015.
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as Taylorism allowed the middle to control the bottom’.19 One cannot – should 
not – overlook the fact that much of the impetus for computational automation, 
in the guise of information technology, was (and remains) administrative.  It’s 
not for nothing that Jon Agar has referred to the computer as the government 
machine, even if that has proved rather easy to forget.20 It is via the office (or, 
metonymically, via Office, now with us 365, if one wanted to trace the history 
through software), automating discourse production specifically, more than the 
factory, that computing tends to enter everyday life, and whilst this is something 
that can be framed in terms of value extraction, there is a risk here that doing 
so can result in an analysis that not only not only leaves in the background or 
simplifies out to the point of irrelevance, numerous aspects of technological 
development, the how of automation, but that one also takes as a given – the 
successful and effective functioning of specific forms of technology – something 
that is in fact far more contingent and experimental. 
 There are a complex set of strategic considerations at work in the 
development of the processes and practices of automation marking the 
post-war era. In this regard, it is worth considering a bit more carefully the 
practical field of relations in terms of which the growing interest in and 
practice of technoscientific automation emerged. In his essay on Norbert 
Wiener, cybernetics and the ‘ontology of the enemy’, Peter Galison makes a 
powerful case for considering a number of wartime scientific developments 
concerned precisely with the machine-human systems (and the automation that 
characterised them) central to the ulterior developments around computation 
– operations research, game theory and cybernetics – as ‘Manichean’ sciences, 
predicated on a ‘particular kind of enemy’, one who was ‘at home in the world 
of strategy, tactics, and manoeuvre, all the while thoroughly inaccessible to us, 
separated by a gulf of distance, speed, and metal’.21 Elaborating on the manner 
in which Wiener’s work on a device designed to predict the zig-zagging nature 
of an enemy pilot’s flight morphed into cybernetics more generally, what comes 
to the fore in Wiener’s work – and it is a feature, Galison argues, that it shares 
with operations research and game theory – is a tacit but profound sense of the 
universe as shaped through a confrontation of opponents: developing initially 
through a conceptualisation of the enemy pilot (and then the friendly pilot) 
as a servomechanism that would facilitate the anticipation of his intentions 
(and so permit his destruction through an automated firing mechanism), the 
cybernetic approach to automation implied a universe split between ‘us’ and 
the inherently, necessarily crafty, machine-like Other. 
 In fighting this cybernetic enemy, Wiener and his team began to conceive 
of the Allied anti-aircraft operations as resembling the foe, and it was a 
short step from this elision of the human and the non-human in the ally to a 
blurring of the human-machine boundary in general. The servomechanical 
enemy became, in the cybernetic vision of the 1940s, the protoype for human 
physiology and, ultimately, for all of human nature … (p233).
 For Galison, the problem that this ontology of the enemy that he 
18. This issue has 
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Hunter Crowther-
Heyck, Herbert A. 
Simon: The Bounds 
of Reason in Modern 
America, Baltimore, 
MA, Johns Hopkins 
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of Chicago Press, 
2014.
19. Harold Leavitt 
and Thomas Whisler, 
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20. Jon Agar, The 
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Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 2003.
21. Peter Galison, 
‘The Ontology of 
the Enemy: Norbert 
Wiener and the 
Cybernetic Vision’ in 
Critical Inquiry, 21,1, 
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reconstructs from Wiener’s work raises is one of (enduring) cultural meanings, 
of a chain of discursive associations which, as he puts it, was ‘forged over 
decades in the laboratory, on the battlefield, in the social sciences, and in 
the philosophy of cybernetics’. Whilst (he acknowledges) there is nothing 
that logically compels acceptance of the ontology tacit in cybernetics, we do 
have to acknowledge ‘the power of a half-century in which these and other 
associations have been reinstantiated at every turn’ (p265). Here perhaps 
begins the recurrent invocation of cybernetics as political technology.22 But 
there is perhaps something here that goes beyond the simple matter of cultural 
associations, something that might give a bit more weight to arguments about 
the configuration of human-machine systems as governmental apparatus, as 
a ‘system of generalised enslavement’, as Alliez and Lazzarato put it (p236). 
The configuration of the war-time laboratory scene, in which strategy dictates 
that the agent whose behaviour is being modelled is of necessity precluded from 
responding to and/or taking an interest in the questions that the scientist asks 
of him, is indicative of a process of abstraction, on the part of the scientist and 
technician, from which any feedback (from the enemy/organism) is excluded. 
In a strategic relationship of enmity, what one wants to know about one’s 
enemy is what his or her weaknesses are: giving your enemy the latitude to 
contest your appraisal of them is fatal. From this point of view, one might 
argue that the automated control promised by the increasingly popular 
cybernetics was linked as much to a practice of abstraction as it was to a theory 
of black-boxes and feedback loops. From this point of view, the interest in and 
popularity of cybernetics, theorised as ‘the’ (quasi-solipsistic) science of control 
may also have something to do with the way in which it was organised as a 
technoscientific practice. In this respect, the configuration of systems in terms 
of black-boxing and feedback loops is not just linked to the manner in which 
this facilitates the development of transferable machinically real abstractions 
(whereby – as Gordon Pask put it ‘precisely the same arrangement of parts in 
the computer can represent the spread of an epidemic, the spread of rumours 
in a community, the development of rust on a piece of galvanised iron and 
diffusion in a semi-conductor’) but also the constitution of the distance at 
which it is possible to hold its objects.23 What Bell later conceptualised as 
intellectual technologies are in many respects the fruit of a profoundly anti-
democratic movement in knowledge production, as Reisch and Mirowski, 
commentating on early post-war conceptions of science, have pointed out.24 
 Modelling humans in terms of the machinic configurations of 
servomechanisms doesn’t just involve a characterisation of what is being 
modelled in terms of an ontology of the enemy. It is predicated on the 
preclusion, which is institutionally, procedurally, organised of any interest on 
the part of organism whose behaviour is being modelled (on threat of death). 
The processes and practices of automation that develop in the theory-led 
world of early systems thinking characteristic of post-war computerisation 
form part of a concrete, practical configuration that necessarily entails a 
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in Éric Alliez and 
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Wars and Capital, 
Los Angeles CA, 
Semiotext(e), 2018. 
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minorisation or disqualification of forms of knowledge that conflict with 
the strategic aims of the system in question. This is what hostility towards 
‘empiricism’ (already well-entrenched in the formal logician’s mistrust of 
natural language) entails in practice. It is an issue that can be confirmed 
by some of the arguments that David Noble makes in the context of his 
discussion of the automation of production in the early post-war period in 
the US. Although he frames the issue in terms of a classic understanding 
of power, where technical people internalise the hierarchical values of their 
patrons (C. Wright Mills’ ‘technical lieutenants of power’) a process which 
in turn informs their sense of what is possible, he points, indirectly, to the 
ways in which the organisation of technical laboratory practice is linked to 
the strategic concerns of military-industrial institutions. 
If an engineer were to come up with a design for a new technical system 
which required for its optimal functioning considerable control over the 
behaviour of his fellow engineers in the laboratory, the design would be 
dismissed as ridiculous, however elegant and up-to-date its components. 
But if the same engineer created the same system for an industrial manager 
or the Air Force and required, for its successful functioning, control over 
the behaviour of industrial workers or soldiers (or even engineers in their 
employ), the design might be deemed viable, even downright ingenious.25 
 
Avowedly Taylorist in inspiration, early work addressing the pragmatics 
of computing technology spoke, with a straight face, about ‘algorithmised 
people’.26 
 It’s not a question here, vis à vis the ontology of the enemy, of suggesting 
that computational automation of the human-machine system kind is 
inherently military. However, it has been a little too easy, in the history and 
historiography, of computing, to bracket out the military element, splitting 
war and economy, with the former usually understood as an interruption 
of the latter, thereby facilitating a presentation of computing in terms 
of the telos of consumer electronics. This, in turn, obscures the strategic 
dimensions of technology production and the power relations of which it is 
the bearer. Allied to this it is of course also impossible to ignore the role of 
the State in this period. Not just in the sense that one might, like Mariana 
Mazzucato, want to call into question the politically useful but economically 
disabling (from a policy point of view) fiction of ‘public – bad, private – good’, 
or, indeed, point towards the inordinately important role of war and the 
preparation for it in the success of Silicon Valley.27 More significantly, from 
the point of view of the ongoing organisation of relations between practices, 
it was precisely in its role as facilitating the constitution and coordination 
professional expertise, in relation to ‘Science’ that the State operated. Gilles 
Deleuze was not wrong to remind us that the State has always relied on an 
image of thought.
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INFRASTRUCTURING AUTOMATION
Contemporary processes and practices of automation extend well beyond 
selectively framed, headline-grabbing, stories about robots and/or artificial 
intelligence. Automation today is not, as one would sometimes be forgiven 
for thinking, simply a particular trend in the use of digital technology, nor is 
it equivalent to the cybernetisation (or ‘cybernation’, as 1960s commentators 
sometimes theorised it) of society. It cannot simply be read off in some sort 
of unbroken continuity with developments during the Cold War, and nor 
can it now be confined to the work of dedicated professional expertise. It’s 
worth remembering that the existence of computation in the modern sense as 
such is predicated on the possibility of automation, on the possibility of there 
being ‘effective procedures’ that operate in conformity with the mathematical 
logic elaborated initially by Alan Turing. It’s not just that there would be no 
point in programming a machine if automation in this sense was impossible: 
programming computers as such would be impossible. Automation is also 
predicated on its desirability, a point that is perhaps more easily forgotten. 
But more important than this is the fact that any activity accomplished 
through digital technology in the present presupposes a complex, ramified 
history of processes and practices of automation, some, but not all of 
which are computational: undersea cables, punch cards, hand calculated 
firing tables, Monte Carlo simulations, and so on. The material traces of 
these histories are sedimented and stratified in the plural, multi-layered, 
infrastructures of computation as a now planetary phenomenon. In this sense 
infrastructures form a material memory and constraining force without which 
further automation and the technological ‘disruption’ it is often purported 
to accomplish would itself be impossible. Given this, representations of 
computational technologies as breaking with the past (modernising to ‘stay 
relevant’ as one report from management consultants PWC put it) are simply 
mendacious. Disruption in the field of digital technology presupposes the 
very much undisrupted stability of a complex, historically and geographically 
specific set of infrastructures, marked by processes of marginalisation, 
disqualification and destruction.
 Aside from the oddly overlooked issue of temporality, the reference 
to infrastructure here is important as it helps point up a number of key 
characteristics of contemporary processes and practices of automation. One 
is the extent to which computation has saturated everyday life, shaping 
expectations and (literally) providing the grounds for an understanding of the 
world. For many people in significant parts of the global North, infrastructure 
has come to be synonymous with a particular set of scarcely articulated 
feelings about the workings of society. As Paul N. Edwards put it (prior to 
the widely publicised infrastructure collapses in America in 2005) they are 
‘largely responsible for the sense of stability of life in the developed world, 
the feeling that things work, and will go on working, without the need for 
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thought or action on the part of users beyond paying the monthly bills’.28 In 
this respect, the smooth, ostensibly friction-free availability of infrastructure 
may be considered in terms of a certain normalising power, operating at a 
particularly quotidian level shaping expectations and which acts, in turn, 
as the ground for judgements typical of modernity: the sense that other 
geographical spaces don’t work, are backward. The counterpart of ubiquitous 
infrastructures is the peculiarly habitual quality of entanglement with them. 
Another key point about the infrastructural dimension of automation is the 
extent to which automation as process and as product operates more or less 
invisibly, in a quasi-naturalised space-time. Edwards, once again, observes 
that ‘the most salient characteristic of technology in the modern (industrial 
and post-industrial) world is the degree to which most technology is not 
salient for most people, most of the time’ (p188). ‘[M]ature technological 
systems’, he goes on ‘reside in a naturalised background, as ordinary and 
unremarkable to us as trees, daylight, and dirt’ (p185). Bruce Mau goes a step 
further, suggesting, with some exaggeration, that the ‘intensely developed 
infrastructures’ through which we (in the global North) live our lives have 
achieved a sort of ‘design nirvana’, accomplishing the secret ambition of 
design, which is, he suggests, to become ‘invisible’.29A third, key point is that 
framing digital technologies as infrastructural renders evident their crucial 
strategic status. The strategic centrality of infrastructures per se is not new. In 
one way or another, infrastructures have always been a crucial element in the 
politics of nation states, indeed, in the shaping of something like a governable 
nation state in the first place. Without the meticulous coordination – via the 
electric telegraph – that was required for railway systems to run effectively, for 
example, no territorially unified organisation of time was possible (see more 
broadly David S. Landes Revolution in Time).30 The ‘technologies of freedom’ 
that were so crucial to the enabling practices of liberal governmentality in the 
nineteenth century – multiplying exchanges across a unified space – imply 
in turn the role of infrastructures necessary to the maintenance of colonial 
rule, just as digital infrastructures are now crucial to the transformation of 
the nation state. Indeed, the conceptual imagination of nebulous entities like 
global civil society or the infosphere are predicated on the now quite marked 
tendency towards the ‘unbundled’ transformation of what Marvin and Graham 
refer to as the ‘modern ideal’31 of integrated, monopolistic, publicly-owned 
large-scale technical systems, themselves the product, in many respects of the 
Fordist era and the organisation of Western societies for total war.32 In the 
words of Keller Easterling, infrastructures today form a set of ‘Teflon-coated 
spatial [and temporal] products’ with an ambiguous relationship to the state-
form, and which, in particular, facilitate the smoothing out of the logistical 
pathways of commodity circulation across the planet.33 
 Infrastructures have, in general – and not without reason, tended to 
be analysed as large-scale technical systems. And although that situation 
is changing – with a lot of interesting work undertaken by historians and 
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geographers in particular – the predominant, and predominantly technical, 
framework for considering digital infrastructures is one that tacitly separates 
out such infrastructures and what they do from questions of subjectivity, 
in spite of the evident connections between the two. When a technical 
infrastructure is analysed in terms of the manner in which it addresses 
a functional, societal need, for example, that issue about the nature of 
subjectivity is kicked into the long grass of ‘need’. But this kind of bifurcated 
thinking, turning a de facto distinction into something more akin to a de jure 
separation, can make it very difficult to understand the ways in which digital 
infrastructures form a constitutive element of experience, folding together 
subjectivity and domains that might more normally be considered cultural, 
even psychological (anxiety) with more or less successful technical processes, 
operations and arrangements. Historians such as Wolfgang Schivelbusch 
or Stephen Kern have nonetheless had little difficulty in tracing the links 
between infrastructure and experience, and whilst there is now an abundant 
literature exploring the fluidity of networked experience (the unintentional 
irony of characteristic modernity in terms of its liquidity), there’s never 
much exploration, other than in terms of vague macroeconomic or epochal 
generalisations, of how such fluidity is constituted. Critical thinking is, as a 
result, left strangely disarmed when it comes to addressing the implication 
of technical practices within politics, and a fortiori, the links of processes and 
practices of automation with anxiety and other forms of agitation. Here it is, 
we might say, the issue of ‘getting a hold’ on capitalism that is at stake.
INFRASTRUCTURE AS POWER RELATION
Whilst it is in many respects correct to consider the processes and practices 
of automation that work to constitute digital technologies as infrastructures 
in terms of the province of very particular and often very exacting forms 
of technical expertise, it will be difficult to understand the broader logic 
of automation if we continue to think along the lines, not just of cast-iron 
divisions between technical and other forms of practice, but also in terms of a 
theoretical discourse that presumes that division in the first place. To be sure, 
as earlier sections of this paper have suggested, the professional expertise of 
the emerging fields of computer science, software engineering and so on, has 
been a critical element in the constitution of the digital infrastructures of the 
present, but processes and practices of automation have extended beyond 
specifically professional expertise for some time. In part, the peculiar compact 
between state and professional expertise traced out by Balogh and others 
had broken down by the 1970s and a new regime of knowledge production 
emerged, allied to a different presentation of scientific practices, now framed 
in terms of the more openly commercial terms of the knowledge economy. 
Of course, the commercialisation of the internet, the emergence of new 
media work and the enormous growth in the use of, for example, mark-up 
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languages, has in turn made the boundary between professional expertise in 
programming and other forms of practice much fuzzier. Certainly, one can 
argue – as STS scholars might – that the work of, say, computer programmers 
is never exclusively technical, and that automation has never been about the 
imposition of technological form on human content. All of that is doubtless 
true. But the more significant point is in fact that much of the work that 
other actors do, is itself or has itself become technical or incipiently so, even 
where it might not appear such. Digital technologies do not operate in an 
unstructured environment: processes and practices of automation do not 
only presuppose the stabilised phylum of digital technological and other 
infrastructures. They also presuppose a more or less ‘patient’ social and 
cultural environment within which they can operate. The predominance of 
a representational understanding of software – in which it mathematically 
models the world as information, which users then simply exchange – all too 
easily overlooks the grey area in which processes and practices are translated 
into material-semiotic forms that are tractable to computation. Some of this 
translation happens within software, but some of it happens in the routinised, 
quasi-formalised, rule-governed regularisation of the non-computational. 
The military and corporate contexts in which the processes and practices of 
digital technological automation, generating ‘algorithmised people’ emerged 
testify to the importance of the regimented, highly regular nature of context, 
but in a world to be constituted by the programming of digital technological 
infrastructures, we all, to some extent, think and act like programmers. 
Structuring the environment for the ongoing work of automation, even if this 
is only in the manner in which users learn to ‘repair’ the errors that digital 
technology makes, is a highly distributed activity. However it is something 
that also gets overlooked a bit too easily in the metonymic discursivisation of 
processes and practices of automation as the ‘algorithmic’ imposition of form 
on content: indeed framing matters in these terms is largely to subscribe to 
the discursive terms of Science as elaborated earlier in this paper.  
 The successful functioning of an algorithm presupposes inputs and outputs 
structured as data, which in turn implies a segmented conforming of the 
actions of people and things to the specific organisation of the technology (140 
characters maximum, this is how you scan a bar code, keyword search, look 
straight at the camera, and so on). It is not simply a matter of ‘representing’ 
things, people, processes, as information. This computer scientific way of 
presenting the issue is not incorrect, from a mathematical point of view, but 
it is remarkably selective in what it pays attention to. Rather it is a question 
of shaping processes of enunciation (in a very broad sense) to adapt to 
technology. Research in the field of ‘cultural techniques’ offers a way of 
understanding some kinds of proto-technological behaviour of this kind, as 
does the historically close fit of software with already well-formalised business 
processes and practices. But rather than arguing here without hesitation in 
favour of the functional efficacy of IT (it’s used because it does what is wanted, 
42     neW FormAtions
it is transparent to intentions, it meets a pre-existing need) it would be just 
as plausible to argue the contrary, to say that it is in fact the very material 
rigidity of computation, its obstinate recalcitrance to intention, particularly in 
its early years, that is most suggestive of its conformative efficacy: ‘talking’ to a 
computer has always meant learning how to adapt to its inflexibility, especially 
when the clunky crudeness of the machine or very high levels of financial 
cost dictated, in the workplace. It is important to acknowledge these kinds of 
sometimes small, sometimes much bigger, shifts and transformations that take 
place around digital technology, to acknowledge that in the background, the 
use – and utility – of machines doesn’t exist independently of the processes 
through which subjectivation happens.  
 Framing processes and practices of automation in these terms is not 
just about questioning the distinction between technical and non-technical 
practices, but by moving beyond the representational presentation of digital 
technologies in terms of the idea of mathematical models of the world, and 
by questioning the tacit self-evidence of use and utility, it becomes possible to 
open up a level of analysis that one could quite reasonably term microphysical 
or micropolitical, since it is constituted at the uncertain limits of an historically 
specific set of power relations. It raises questions about how bodies are 
explicitly or implicitly invested by digital technological infrastructures, or 
processes of infrastructuring (to highlight the relational quality) because they 
are indeed invested, in one way or another, by automation, from the outset. 
 Referring to power relations is, of course, a way of bringing Foucauldian 
ideas, specifically about governmentality, more explicitly into the picture that is 
being painted here of automation. It is, precisely, in terms of governmentality 
that Foucault comes to frame his conceptualisation of power as a ‘way in 
which certain actions may structure the field of possible actions’ ‘modes 
of action upon possible action, the action of others’ and so on.34  But one 
might reasonably ask what sort of governmentality operates across digital 
infrastructures? Is it true that digital technological infrastructures facilitate 
forms of action at a distance in a manner akin to the ‘technologies of freedom’ 
that Foucauldian scholars in particular have associate with the governmental 
practices of the nation states of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
liberalism? When, as Andrew Barry has put it, ‘communications infrastructures 
came to function as perfect embodiments of the liberal political imagination: 
maximising the density, intensity and spatial extension of interactions within 
the social body itself while, at the same time, minimising the direct demands 
made by the state on the people’.35 
A NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENTALITY?
It’s not at all clear that contemporary digital infrastructures work through a 
relation to substantially independent individuals addressed as if endowed with 
a capacity to ‘judge for themselves’, or, indeed that the complex organisation 
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of surveillance and regime of generalised traceability now associated with global 
flows of information, has anything very liberal about it. On this point, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s arguments concerning the ‘automation and autonomisation’ 
of the war machine in the post-war era of organised (in)security, developed 
by Éric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato in terms of an analysis of the ‘global 
war machine of capital’, is perhaps better attuned to the functioning of 
power relations across digital infrastructures, than the more human-scientific 
analytic focus of Foucauldian governmentality studies. The automation and 
autonomisation of the war machine in the Cold War era points directly, albeit 
allusively, to precisely the emergent information technological managerialism 
discussed earlier in this paper and its geopolitical presuppositions, linking 
the kind of dynamics usually considered to operate ‘endogeneously’ under 
the rubrics of ‘the’ technological and ‘the’ economic, into direct connection 
with shifting forms of knowledge and expertise. But more interestingly 
for the purposes of the present discussion, perhaps, it brings into play a 
specifically machinic vocabulary for the analysis of automation, one which Alliez 
and Lazzarato (the latter in particular) have developed for understanding 
the extensive investment in the complex grey areas where the boundary 
between technical machines and human subjects becomes blurred. A key 
aspect of a form of governmentality which operates through technology, 
‘[machinic] enslavement, Lazzarato puts it in Governing by Debt, does not work 
with ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’, it works on their deterritorialisation (or their 
decodification), that is, with the molecular components, the non-individuated 
intensive, subhuman potentialities of subjectivity and the non-individuated, 
intensive, molecular component parts and potentialities of matter and 
machines’.36 Employing additionally Deleuze’s notion of dividuality, Lazzarato 
further points out that under conditions of ‘enslavement’ human agents 
not only form part of a broader machinic assemblage, in which the usual 
oppositions between human and machine break down, but further that ‘the 
component parts of subjectivity (intelligence, affects, sensations, cognition, 
memory, physical force) are no longer unified in an ‘I’, they no longer have 
an individuated subject as referent. Intelligence, affects, sensations, cognition, 
memory, and physical force are now components whose synthesis no longer 
lies in the person but in the assemblage’ (Governing by Debt, p188). The matter 
of whether or not there ever was a substantially independent autonomous 
subject, an ‘I’ that unified the component parts of subjectivity is moot, but the 
point is a political one: power relations as operative across infrastructures don’t 
find as their unifying point of integration the citizen of the liberal democratic 
polity but imply instead a ‘user’ envisaged from within digital technologies 
as a very precisely specified set of capacities for interacting with machines. 
 Linked by Lazzarato to Foucault’s arguments about security as the 
organisation of a milieu, the governmental role of machinic enslavement 
is evidently connected with the slow emergence of digital technological 
infrastructures in the post-war era, the emergence of administrative 
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governance and the managerialism associated with information technology. 
Curiously, one of the earliest points of emergence of this ‘milieu’, presenting 
dramatic confirmation of the machinic effects it entails, is provided by trading 
in finance markets. Karin Knorr-Cetina’s research on what she calls the 
‘temporally constituted screen world’ ‘inhabited’ by traders looks a great deal 
like the machinery producing subjectivity in Lazzarato’s account of machinic 
enslavement, wherein ‘money, stock prices, the spread, algorithms, and 
scientific equations and formulas constitute semiotics that make the capitalist 
social machine function in view of both valorisation and the production of 
subjectivity’ (p189). For Knorr-Cetina, informed by the phenomenological 
sociology of Alfred Schutz, what is constituted through the screen is in fact 
a ‘world’ ‘not simply a “medium” for the transmission of messages and 
information. It is a building site on which a whole economic and epistemological 
world is erected’ as a consequence of ‘what appears to be a total immersion in 
the action in which they [the traders] take part’.37 
 There are clearly differences between the organisation of the screen world 
of traders and the broader investments of a governmental apparatus and 
it is important not to forget that in the account Lazzarato offers, machinic 
enslavement is one component of contemporary governmentality as he 
understands it (the other being subjection, subjectivation of the kind that 
operates through discursive interpellation). It’s also important not to slip 
back into the ironic stance of mass culture critique, which is never far away 
when we talk about others and their relationship to the machinery of the 
culture industry. In the present context, this is a risk which presents itself 
in particular when the emphasis is on human-machine systems as already-
constituted, complete entities, when, that is, one takes as a given what is in 
fact only a cybernetic/informatic/technological ideal. Certainly – and Knorr 
Cetina’s work confirms this – the captivating effects of machinic enslavement 
are very real, but not all configurations of digital infrastructures attain a similar 
degree of immersive completeness. Contrast, in this respect, computer games, 
social media platforms and email, for example. Nor are all forms of digital 
infrastructure produced in the same way as the technology for traders. More 
mundane, and widespread, practices such as setting up a blog, configuring 
a CMS, or using the API of a social media platform for the purposes of data 
gathering are quite different to the work of programming in finance. 
 Remaining with the question of the production of subjectivity, in 
relation to processes and practices of automation, it is to the more directly 
micropolitical dimension of analysis that we must turn. For if it is not simply 
to become a generic, catch-all term that replicates generic and generalising 
claims about (cybernetic) human-machine systems, the concept of machinic 
enslavement requires us to consider more directly the ways in which digital 
infrastructures invest bodies and their propensities, their habits, drives, and 
so on.38 Experience in digital infrastructures then becomes a crucial datum 
in a concern, less with the functional effects of new forms of subjection, and 
37. Karin Knorr 
Cetina and 
Urs Bruegger, 
‘Inhabiting 
Technology: The 
Global Lifeform of 
Financial Markets’, 
Current Sociology, 50, 
3, 2002, pp395, 396. 
38. There are 
evident parallels 
here with Gilbert 
Simondon’s work on 
individuation.
AutomAtion Anxieties     45
more with the processes through which assemblages take shape, opening 
up or closing down possibilities for concrete transformation.39 Here, and 
following instead Guattari, it is crucial to insist that the production of 
subjectivity is something that operates at an existential pathic level. The idea 
of ‘pathic subjectivation’ that Guattari develops in his later writings and 
the modularised conception of ‘partial enunciation’ that he associates with 
it extends the logic of non-discursive intensities and the pluralisation of 
semiotics that formed such a key part of his work with Deleuze.40 Reference 
to the ‘pathic’ brings aesthesis, the incessant mobility of sensing, as the 
phenomenologist Renaud Barbaras has put it, into view as a key element 
in the production of subjectivity.41 From the point of view of addressing 
processes and practices of automation, it draws our attention precisely to the 
constitution and configuration, the cartographic complexity of the affective 
textures of infrastructural experience, a complexity that becomes difficult 
to apprehend when one turns to generic ideas about information flow and 
exchange, for example. Here, the relevant datum is not what Edwards 
articulated as the sense of stability, the grounds on which people sense that 
society ‘works’, because this sense of permanence, the ‘modern ideal’, is well 
on the way to disappearing. Rather, it is the impermanence and fragility, the 
decomposition of the social and cultural forms that digital infrastructures 
parasite and the demented production of software to sit between the global 
‘space of flows’ and the populations that produce those flows that becomes 
relevant. What matters is less the seamless integration of users into systems 
and more the dynamics generated through the fragmented patchiness 
and lack of ‘interoperability’, constant processes of software updating, the 
stupidity and ineptness of systems, the refusal to standardise, the increasingly 
carefully policed terms on which one can engage with a technology (Zittrain’s 
tethering) – and everything one is obliged to do to correct such failings, 
‘repair’ work, ‘articulation’ work, ‘junction’ work, and so on. Such features 
of processes and practices of automation are usually presented as negligible 
contingencies, something that is probably true from the statistical point 
of view that informs the commercial strategies of technology companies. 
But they are certainly not negligible from the point of view of the logic 
of automation in digital infrastructures. Digital infrastructures are not a 
complete milieu, not a seamless infosphere, they exist alongside other strata 
constitutive of society or culture, and in this respect effectively generate 
disorientation and ambiguity, amplifying discordances within practices, 
between systems (or specific universes of reference, to use Guattari’s terms), 
dismantling the existential territories of everyday life, generating new loci 
and processes of enunciation (the investment of the hand and its gestural 
capacities), and so on. 
 Susan Leigh Star, a well-respected scholar of infrastructures, (and someone 
hardly suspect of Guattarian leanings) has, with Karen Ruhleder, drawn on 
Bateson’s notion of the double bind and the schizophrenising problems 
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such double binds can generate, to sketch out a phenomenon they refer to 
as ‘infrastructural transcontextual syndrome’ to account for the problems 
generated through the conflict created in digital infrastructure design and 
deployment in an organisational context.42 Exploring the challenges of 
developing information infrastructure for scientific practices in the early 
1990s, they were interested in ‘barriers to use’, why it was that particular 
systems failed to achieve the widespread adoption that might allow one 
reasonably to talk about an infrastructure. When a design flaw in a system 
can be interpreted as user error, for example, or when the knowledge context 
of designers is presumed as necessary but is unavailable to users (‘you just 
need to FTP the file …’), we are in the realm of the double bind. Being 
situated in very different contexts, with little commonality, the practices of 
system designers and system users were ripe for the generation of confusion. 
Interestingly, for Leigh Star and Ruhleder, one can only really start to talk 
about the successful ‘infrastructuring’ of an IT system once double binds of 
the kind they outline are resolved. Without this happening, they argued, it 
is difficult for automation, or automatism, to occur. 
 And yet, germane though Star and Ruhleder’s account is for understanding 
the contingencies of digital infrastructural automation, technology 
development subsequent to the early 1990s has seen a fairly systematic shift 
in how infrastructures, infrastructuring, is achieved. Not through the kind of 
nuanced and sensitive dialogue between different communities of practice, 
between system designers and system users, that they called for, but rather 
in terms of a progressive automation of many of the processes – installing an 
operating system, for example – through which users would otherwise have 
come into contact with technical universes of reference.  But one cannot for 
all that say that disorientation and ambiguity have thereby disappeared, or 
double binds of the kind tracked by Star and Ruhleder been resolved. 
CONCLUSION: GETTING A HOLD?
Ending this discussion of automation anxieties with a brief set of references 
to the disunified, disorganised nature of digital infrastructural experience, 
and what might seem to be failures in processes and practices of automation 
is not accidental. Commentators, both for and against, have a marked 
tendency to present this experience in remarkably coherent, unitary terms, 
whether they are eulogising over friction-free flow or human-machine 
cybernetic enslavement. But this, as has been pointed out, is to risk taking 
a theoretical ideal for reality. Why present matters in this way? Why blur 
the distinction between technical and non-technical practices and insist on 
inserting processes and practices of automation into the relational fabric 
of power, rather than present automation in more conventionally political-
economic terms? And why draw attention to the complexities of contemporary 
digital infrastructures? In part, this is simply about an empirical insistence 
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on the way that automation happens and avoiding the trick of theories that 
make seemingly interesting political claims on the basis of overly simplistic 
abstractions. If digital technological infrastructures are part of an historically 
specific organisation of power relations, and if processes and practices of 
automation are an important aspect of the contemporary production of 
subjectivity, one can’t simply view the political challenges that they present as 
one of simple ‘reappropriation’ or, indeed, acceleration. Digital infrastructures 
are marked by asymmetries of power. Not irreversibly so, perhaps, but certainly 
in such a manner as to complicate considerably the manner in which one 
might seek to understand the growing hold of planetary computation. What 
is needed are forms of analysis that build on the resistance that is located, 
albeit in highly ambiguous forms at the uncertain limits of power, in the 
complex fabric of human-machine relations.
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